Public Hearing Block 2

Hearing Block 2 examined how antisemitic hostility toward Jewish Australians escalated into a genuine terrorism threat in the two years since October 7 2023. It examined whether Australia's security agencies had the right tools in place to respond by the time of the Bondi Beach attack.

ASIO Director‑General Mike Burgess AM told the Commission the national security picture shifted dramatically after October 7 2023, with antisemitic behaviour escalating from threats and intimidation into direct attacks on Jewish people, businesses and places of worship, and antisemitism left “unchecked” in ways that risked normalising violence.

AFP Assistant Commissioner Stephen Nutt described antisemitism becoming “one of its most pressing priorities”, explaining that violent protests, extremist chants and prohibited hate symbols were treated as warning signs that antisemitic hate could escalate into terrorist acts. He said the Bondi attack confirmed the warning signs authorities had already been tracking: that antisemitic hostility could escalate into terrorism, not remain a community safety issue alone.

The Commission heard from agencies that have stood up new structures to coordinate Australia’s response to antisemitism as a terrorism threat in the period since October 7. The AFP told the Commission a national antisemitism coordination group was created while NSW Police witnesses, including Assistant Commissioners Leanne McCusker, Peter McKenna and Scott Cook, outlined operations such as Shelter, Strike Force Pearl and Reassurance, set up to tackle serious antisemitic offences and reassure the community after October 7. These dedicated operations were set up to target serious antisemitic offending, resulting in 22 offenders being charged with 178 offences. 

Assistant Commissioner Kirsty Hayward acknowledged significant gaps in counter-terrorism ahead of the Bondi terrorist attack; only one formal consultation with ASIO before the terrorism threat level was raised from “possible” to “probable” in August 2024, none afterwards, the removal of a senior intelligence analyst from the firearms registry for several years, leaving no embedded intelligence capacity during the lead-up to the Bondi attack.

Evidence pointed to a recurring breakdown in communication and alignment between community security bodies and police when assessing threats to Jewish community events, prompting procedural changes post December 2025. Chanukah by the Sea became the clearest example where a “likely” terrorist threat assessment did not translate into the level of protection the Commission – and the community – would have expected

CSG NSW witnesses (ABO and ABP) told the Commission they had assessed a terrorist attack on the Jewish community as “likely”. They recalled warning police that Chanukah by the Sea was a high‑risk event and requested a continuous police presence; that request was declined.

Eastern Suburbs Commander ABQ and Assistant Commissioner Peter McKenna confirmed police relied on mobile patrols officers who could attend and leave without certainty around frequency or time rather than a static security presence, and that no formal written threat assessment was prepared for the event. In hindsight, they accepted that similar events should be treated more like High Holy Days, with higher‑level planning, documented risk assessments and “static” security at major Jewish gathering.

NSW Police Assistant Commissioner Kirsty Hayward and Acting Deputy Commissioner Peter McKenna outlined changes introduced since the attack at Bondi to the Commissioner: expanding Operation Shelter and moving to a more proactive posture, developing a 250‑person Armed Response Command equipped with long‑arm weapons to replace Shelter, building a small intelligence team in the firearms registry, and trialling new case management and digital systems so firearms licensing decisions are more consistent and better informed by national data.