Public Hearing Block 3
29 June - 10 July 2026, Sydney
The Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion has now completed Hearing Block 3, focused on examining how antisemitic content and other hateful speech spread in the online environment and across media.
Across Hearing Block 3, the Commission heard from Bondi survivors, community members, public figures, researchers, platform representatives and regulators about the role of social media, fringe forums and traditional media in amplifying abuse, conspiracy theories and intimidation directed at Jewish Australians. Evidence ranged from sustained online harassment, doxxing and deepfakes to app-based abuse targeting children and teenagers. The Commission also examined whether the current model of platform self-regulation is capable of responding to antisemitism at the scale and speed required for the issue.
The evidence presented is building a clearer picture of how antisemitism is experienced, amplified and sustained online, and how that harm is flowing into school life, public participation, cultural life and broader community safety.
A comprehensive overview of Hearing Block 3 can be found on the Commission’s website.
Hearing Block 3 examined the spread of antisemitism and other forms of hateful speech online, in broadcasting, and in traditional media.
The Commission heard evidence on the prevalence and impact of antisemitic content, the role and effectiveness of social media platforms, media organisations and regulators in response to harmful content, and potential reforms to better prevent and address antisemitism across digital and broadcast environments.
Key Themes
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A central focus of Hearing Block 3 was whether social media platforms are effectively monitoring, moderating, and removing hateful content, as well as designing safer systems and providing sufficient transparency for regulators. Expert witnesses pointed to inconsistent moderation, algorithms that amplify inflammatory content, and limited accountability when antisemitic abuse is reported.
Arsen Ostrovsky gave evidence that deepfake and manipulated images of him spread rapidly following the Bondi attack, while research presented to the Commission described a "spiral of hate" in which major events trigger sustained surges in antisemitic content online. The Commission also heard from the eSafety Commissioner that many Jewish victims of serious online abuse fall outside existing legal thresholds for intervention.
In the second week of hearings, Zachary Hecht (TikTok) told the Commission the platform does not track removals of antisemitic content by targeted group, meaning it cannot determine whether antisemitism on the service is increasing or decreasing. Rachel Lord (YouTube) told the Commission that a video falsely describing Arsen Ostrovsky as an "intelligence asset" and the Bondi attack as a "false flag" had been reviewed by YouTube and found not to breach its Community Guidelines. Asked what would happen if the video were reported again, she said it would not be removed, and did not dispute Counsel Assisting's suggestion that this revealed "a really serious deficiency" in YouTube's hate speech policies.
Tal-Or Cohen Montemayor (Cyberwell) reported antisemitic content removal rates of more than 90 per cent when using trusted escalation channels, compared with rates as low as 22% for ordinary users reporting the same content.
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Multiple witnesses described the same observable pattern of prolonged online abuse. Witnesses described doxxing, deepfakes, threats, conspiracy theories and reputational attacks that escalate once names, employers or creative networks are exposed. Dr Lee Kofman described the leaking of a Jewish creatives WhatsApp group, spreadsheets naming members and their employers, and serious professional fallout for people identified in those leaks.
Tahli Blicblau, CEO of The Dor Foundation, told the Commission that after earlier witnesses gave evidence they were met with posts. Posts and social media presented to the Commission included examples calling to “kill all Jews”, bring back gas chambers, and forcibly expel Jews from Australia, alongside sexually degrading and dehumanising abuse. The Dor Foundation’s analysis found only a small portion of reported posts were removed.
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Children and teenagers appear to be encountering antisemitic and extremist content earlier, faster and in more disguised ways than many adults realise. Witness ACE described her daughter being subjected to Nazi salutes, swastikas and a TikTok post that used her image alongside the phrase “g@s inhl3r” - a coded way of writing “gas inhaler” to evade content moderation. Witness ACF gave evidence about Discord messages sent to his 11‑year‑old son that invoked Hamas, Hitler and self‑harm.
Expert evidence from Director of Moonshot, Theresa Rajah, suggested that children as young as 12 are being radicalised online, often through gaming, memes, violence-heavy content, and “edgy” humour rather than overt political messaging. She made clear pathways into harmful spaces do not look obviously ideological at first, making it harder for parents, schools and platforms to spot early warning signs.
This theme mirrors rising concerns voiced in broader conversations about increasing radicalisation online, as well as concerns raised in several accounts heard in Hearing Block 1.
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A major focus of Hearing Block 3 was whether platform design, moderation systems, algorithms, and regulatory settings are contributing to the spread of online antisemitism.
Dr Andre Oboler gave evidence that some platforms treat antisemitism as a political issue rather than a form of racism. Hannah Rose, an expert witness from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, described how memes, emojis, and coded language allow users to evade moderation.
The Commission also heard from the eSafety Commissioner and police about gaps in Australia's regulatory framework, including high legal thresholds for intervention, limited resourcing, and inconsistent information sharing. The Commission also examined whether platform self-regulation is keeping pace with antisemitism. Zachary Hecht (TikTok) confirmed the platform has no content moderators based in Australia, no independent oversight board, and no plans to offer Australian users an independent appeals process. Rachel Lord (YouTube) said the platform would comply with any future Australian regulation but does not consider additional regulation necessary. Neither platform provided data that would allow the Commission to independently assess whether antisemitism is increasing or decreasing on their services.
The Commission also heard evidence from The Dor Foundation of an antisemitic TikTok comment that was correctly identified by the platform's automated systems, but then reinstated twice by human reviewers on appeal, and removed only after the organisation escalated the matter and the Commission became involved.
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The Royal Commission has acknowledged from the outset that people who participate in its work may face heightened risks. Concerns have been reinforced by the online abuse directed at witnesses following earlier hearing blocks.
Evidence from Tahli Blicblau and The Dor Foundation showed that witnesses who came forward in previous hearings were later targeted with calls for execution, concentration camps, deportation and firebombing, alongside false claims that they had fabricated their evidence.
Evidence from Week Two reinforced concerns around platform decision‑making. Representatives from YouTube confirmed that a video making false and defamatory claims about Bondi survivor Arsen Ostrovsky remains publicly accessible because, under YouTube’s current interpretation of its hate‑speech policy, questioning a survivor’s honesty or motives does not constitute a violation unless it involves denial of “loss of life.”
Josh Burns MP described the online abuse directed at him and his family following the firebombing of his electorate office, while Cr Daniel Rosenfeld recounted being told Jews did not belong in Australia after attending an event for the President of Israel, illustrating how public representation can trigger identity-based attacks.
This theme mirrors evidence that was heard in Hearing Block 1 in which multiple witnesses described their experiences of concealing their Jewish identity as a coping mechanism.
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Week two of Hearing Block 3 focused on examining trust, accountability and complaints processes within Australia's public broadcasters when reporting on the Israel-Gaza conflict. Australia's Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, Jillian Segal AO, renewed her call for an independent oversight body, arguing the ABC should not be "marking its own homework".
Segal raised concerns about ABC and SBS coverage, including SBS's use of Gaza Health Ministry casualty figures without sufficient context and the ABC's handling of an inaccurate claim about the deaths of babies in Gaza, which the ABC Ombudsman found breached editorial standards. She told the Commission that ABC corrections were often slower and less prominent than the original reporting, that the broadcaster has a "special responsibility to get it right", and that inaccurate reporting on Israel has coincided with increases in antisemitic incidents.
During his hearing, ABC Editorial Director Gavin Fang accepted that the broadcaster's failure to promptly correct a 2025 report that 40,000 Gazan babies would starve within 48 hours was "a bad mistake". He also defended the ABC's decision not to adopt the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism. SBS Director of News and Current Affairs Amanda Wicks said SBS instead relies on police, the legal system and affected communities rather than adopting a formal definition.
The Commission also heard that responsibility for editorial policy and staff training sits across different parts of the ABC. Gavin Fang said his role covers editorial policy and guidelines, but not journalist training, raising questions about how the broadcaster ensures staff can consistently distinguish legitimate criticism of Israel from antisemitism targeting Jewish Australians.
Hearing Videos
Day 1: Monday 29 June 2026
Day 2: Tuesday 30 June 2026
Day 3: Wednesday 1 July 2026
Day 4: Thursday 2 July 2026
Day 5: Friday 3 July 2026
Day 6: Monday 6 July 2026
Day 7: Tuesday 7 July 2026
Day 8: Thursday 9 July 2026
Day 9: Friday 10 July 2026