Public Hearing Block 2

25-28 May 2026, Sydney

From 25-27 May 2026, the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion held its second block of public hearings in Sydney. This block is examining the circumstances surrounding the attack at Bondi on 14 December 2025, with a particular focus on terrorism threat level and security environment in the lead up. Matters identified in the Royal Commission’s Interim Report (released 30 April 2026) will also be examined as needed.

Hearings from 28 May 2026 onwards in this block will be closed to the public to avoid prejudice to national security and/or the ongoing criminal proceedings relating to the attack. 

We are deeply grateful to every person who had the courage to step into the witness box.

If you have not yet made a submission, now is the time.

The Commission can only act on what it hears. Without your story, nothing changes. You don't need perfect words or formal language just your experience is enough.

Submissions are open until 14 June 2026. Make your submission: ascengagement.royalcommission.gov.au/submissions

Below you will find a summary of each witness' testimony, in order of appearance. Where witnesses gave evidence anonymously, their details have been withheld in line with the Commission's directions

Day 1: Monday 25th May 2026

  • ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess told the Royal Commission that while the agency shifted resources towards foreign interference and espionage from 2022, counter-terrorism capabilities were not left under-resourced. He said the security environment changed dramatically following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, with ASIO observing an immediate rise in antisemitic behaviour that escalated from threats and intimidation to direct attacks on Jewish people, businesses and places of worship. Burgess said these developments contributed to Australia's terrorism threat level being raised to “probable” in August 2024, alongside a broader increase in politically motivated violence across a range of extremist ideologies.

    Burgess said ASIO intensified its engagement with the Jewish community following October 7 and has continued to devote resources to addressing antisemitism-related security threats. He confirmed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was behind attacks including the Adass Israel Synagogue arson through the use of proxies and agents, and warned that Australia remains in a heightened threat environment where lone-actor attacks can emerge with little warning. Despite growing pressure from both terrorism and foreign interference threats, Burgess maintained ASIO had sufficient resources and was not knowingly leaving serious security matters untreated.

  • Senior Australian Federal Police officer Stephen Nutt told the Royal Commission that the October 7 Hamas attacks fundamentally changed Australia's national security environment and prompted growing concerns that rising antisemitism could escalate into acts of terrorism. He said authorities observed an increase in violent protests, antisemitic chants and the public display of symbols associated with terrorist organisations, leading antisemitism to become a strategic priority for the AFP.

    Nutt said the AFP established Operation Avalite following the Adass Israel Synagogue arson attack in December 2024 and created a national antisemitism coordination group to strengthen intelligence sharing and law enforcement responses across jurisdictions. While investigators later determined the January 2025 Dural caravan incident was a fabricated terror plot, he acknowledged it had a significant psychological impact on the Jewish community. Nutt told the Commission there remains an enduring threat to Jewish Australians, with authorities continuing to monitor and respond to antisemitism as part of Australia's broader national security and counter-terrorism framework.

  • NSW Police Assistant Commissioner Leanne McCusker told the Royal Commission that while regular intelligence briefings on threats to Jewish interests were produced in the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, they ceased after December that year as information was instead managed through Operation Shelter and other intelligence channels. She acknowledged that, with hindsight, a specific threat assessment could and should have been considered for the Chanukah by the Sea event at Bondi in December 2025, noting such assessments help inform police resourcing and operational planning.

    McCusker's evidence also highlighted the sharp rise in antisemitic incidents across New South Wales since October 7, with hate crimes against Jewish victims increasing from 43 incidents in the third quarter of 2023 to 231 in the fourth quarter, before reaching 841 incidents in 2025. She said the increase was clearly linked to the aftermath of the Hamas attacks and reflected a continuing and concerning threat environment. In response, NSW Police established several dedicated operations, including Operation Shelter, Strike Force Pearl and Operation Reassurance, with Strike Force Pearl alone resulting in 22 offenders being charged with 178 offences related to serious antisemitic crimes.

  • Witness ABO, a representative of the Community Security Group (CSG) NSW, told the Royal Commission that cooperation between the Jewish community, NSW Police and ASIO increased significantly following October 7, 2023, describing both agencies as highly responsive and committed to protecting the community. Witness ABO outlined extensive engagement with authorities, including regular threat briefings and intelligence sharing, and revealed that CSG had warned NSW Police ahead of the 2025 Chanukah by the Sea event that the threat of a terrorist attack against the Jewish community was considered "likely". The assessment identified the event as a major concern and prompted a request for a continuous police presence throughout its duration.

    Witness ABO also told the Commission that CSG deployed 12 volunteers to the event and that security costs for the NSW Jewish community have risen sharply in response to the heightened threat environment, with commercial guarding expenses expected to reach approximately $12.5 million in 2026. The evidence highlighted the growing security burden facing the community and its increasing reliance on both volunteer and commercial security arrangements to protect Jewish sites and events.

  • Witness ABP, a senior CSG NSW staff member, told the Royal Commission that the organisation specifically sought a continuous police presence at the Chanukah by the Sea event in the days before the December 2025 terrorist attack, citing the heightened threat environment, the open-air nature of the event and the inability of CSG personnel to be armed. The witness said CSG contacted the Eastern Suburbs Police Area Commander on 8 December and later spoke with the Operations Inspector, who advised that NSW Police did not believe a static police presence was required based on its internal risk assessment.

    Witness ABP said CSG expressed concern that mobile police patrols would not provide the same level of reassurance or protection for attendees, arguing that a permanent on-site presence was necessary given the anticipated crowd size and security risks. The witness told the Commission that, from CSG's perspective, intermittent police taskings were an inadequate substitute because officers could attend and leave without any certainty around frequency or duration.

Day 2: Tuesday 26th May 2026

  • Before proceedings commenced on Tuesday, Royal Commissioner Virginia Bell condemned the harassment and intimidation directed at members of the Jewish community who have appeared before the Royal Commission. Commissioner Bell revealed that one matter had already been referred to the Australian Federal Police for investigation and said the Commission was closely monitoring and documenting offensive social media posts targeting witnesses.

    Commissioner Bell stated: “There is something I would like to say, and it concerns the harassment and intimidation to which members of the Jewish community who have given evidence before this commission have been subject… I should indicate that in one instance the matter has been referred to the Australian Federal Police for investigation.

    “The Commission is keeping a close eye on these instances and recording these offensive social media posts. Quite what this undiluted level of hatred and bigotry directed towards members of the Jewish community is thought to benefit by those who post these remarks is lost on me, but the commission has, as one of its principal objects, understanding and assessing the lived experience of antisemitism by members of the Jewish community, and it is being informed by conduct of this character.”

  • Witness ABQ, Commander of NSW Police's Eastern Suburbs Police Area Command, told the Royal Commission that decisions regarding police resourcing for the 2025 Chanukah by the Sea event were largely left to the discretion of the Operations Inspector, with no formal requirement for a documented risk assessment, threat assessment or specific guideline governing resource allocation for community events. While ABQ said she agreed with the resourcing decisions made at the time, she acknowledged that key warnings had been received in the lead-up to the event, including communications from CSG and ASIO assessments highlighting an elevated terrorism threat to crowded places and religious events during the holiday period.

    ABQ rejected suggestions that the event had been incorrectly categorised or under-resourced based on the information available at the time, maintaining there was no specific intelligence indicating a direct threat to the event. However, she acknowledged that, with hindsight, events of this nature should be treated more similarly to Jewish High Holy Days and could warrant a higher level of planning and security support in the future. She also agreed that resources such as Operation Shelter, which had been de-escalated by December 2025, would have been beneficial and confirmed that enhanced security measures, including police officers equipped with long arms, have since been approved for some major events.

  • NSW Police Assistant Commissioner Peter McKenna told the Royal Commission that the December 2025 Chanukah by the Sea terrorist attack marked a fundamental shift in Australia's security environment, bringing the threat faced by the Jewish community in line with that experienced by Jewish communities overseas. He said NSW Police had since significantly expanded Operation Shelter, moved towards a more proactive security posture and begun deploying officers with long arms at major events, reflecting what he described as a new and enduring threat environment.

    McKenna also acknowledged shortcomings in the way community events were assessed prior to the attack, confirming there were no published guidelines or standardised risk assessment processes to assist local commanders when allocating police resources. While he said police had relied heavily on specific intelligence and local discretion before December 2025, he revealed NSW Police is now developing a consistent risk assessment framework for events across the organisation. McKenna confirmed there was no documented threat assessment prepared for the Chanukah events in 2025 and said future Chanukah celebrations would likely be managed in a similar way to Jewish High Holy Days, with greater coordination, planning and security support.

  • Assistant Commissioner Scott Cook told the Royal Commission that NSW Police only held one formal consultation with ASIO before the national terrorism threat level was raised from “possible” to “probable” in August 2024, and that there was no further engagement or briefing after the change was announced. He said NSW Police did not seek additional meetings with ASIO and that further consultation was not considered necessary, noting the decision to adjust the threat level was ultimately a matter for ASIO, although he acknowledged closer and earlier briefings would have been beneficial.

    Cook also gave evidence on internal capability issues, including the removal of an intelligence analyst role in the firearms registry in 2021 as part of a business review, before it was reinstated in 2023 and filled the following year. He said NSW Police has since supplemented the registry’s intelligence capacity through other systems and training. In relation to the December 14, 2025 Bondi Beach terrorist attack, Cook outlined the rapid police response, including the fatal shooting of one offender within minutes and the apprehension of another shortly after, and said the investigation identified capability gaps such as the need for greater access to long-arm weapons and enhanced training. He confirmed NSW Police is now developing a 250-person Armed Response Command to replace Operation Shelter, with all officers equipped with long arms.

Day 3: Wednesday 27th May 2026

  • Deputy Commissioner David Hudson told the Royal Commission that NSW Police will not grant additional law enforcement powers to the Community Security Group (CSG), arguing that doing so would risk creating division between communities and unequal treatment. He said while CSG plays an important role in supporting the Jewish community, police already have sufficient capacity to respond to threats and allocate resources where needed.

    Hudson also confirmed the establishment of a new 250-strong Armed Response Command to replace Operation Shelter, developed in response to the December 14, 2025 Bondi attack, with officers deployed in both static and mobile roles and trained for higher-risk armed response. He said the unit would operate under centralised oversight and be fully operational within two years. Hudson outlined that Operation Shelter, which he established after October 7, 2023, currently deploys around 150 officers daily and will continue until the new command is fully in place.

    He further told the Commission that NSW Police had not sought additional counter-terrorism funding in the period between October 2023 and the Bondi attack, and confirmed that Strike Force Pearl had been wound down after arrests in 2025 reduced the wave of antisemitic offences. Hudson also raised concerns about inconsistent information sharing between Commonwealth and state agencies, while reiterating that NSW Police maintained a broad approach to sharing threat intelligence where risks were identified.

  • NSW Police Assistant Commissioner Kirsty Hayward told the Royal Commission that the firearms registry operated without a dedicated senior intelligence analyst for more than three years between November 2021 and February 2025, despite approval to reinstate the role being granted in late 2023. She confirmed the gap meant there was no embedded intelligence capacity within the registry during a period that included the lead-up to the December 14, 2025 Bondi Beach terrorist attack, with intelligence work instead dispersed across other units and supported on an ad hoc basis by State Intelligence Command, though she said this arrangement was not formally documented.

    Hayward said the intelligence analyst role had previously been removed following a 2021 review that deemed it under-utilised, but acknowledged concerns were later raised about capability gaps and public safety risks, leading to its reinstatement and expansion after the Bondi attack. She confirmed that the registry now includes a small intelligence team and is trialling broader reforms, including a “cradle to grave” case management model and digital system upgrades aimed at improving consistency in firearms licensing decisions.

    She also outlined limitations in the registry’s access to intelligence, noting that adjudicators may not always see full narrative intelligence reports and must sometimes rely on external agencies for clarification, particularly where Commonwealth caveats restrict use of information for administrative decisions. Hayward acknowledged this can create practical difficulties in assessing firearms applications and said NSW Police is seeking improved national data integration and a more streamlined intelligence framework going forward.